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Life Insurance Holdings and Well-Being of Surviving Spouses
Timothy F. Harris and Aaron Yelowitz∗
Premature death of a breadwinner can have devastating financial con-
sequences on surviving dependents. This study investigates the role
of life insurance in mitigating the long-run financial consequences of
spousal mortality. Using the Health and Retirement Study, we ex-
amine individuals whose spouses died during or soon after his or her
peak earnings years. Using an instrumental variables approach, we
find that lump-sum life insurance payouts do not significantly influ-
ence spousal well-being. JEL: D31, G22, I31, J32, J33, J38
Keywords: Life Insurance, Poverty, Ageing
Death of a breadwinner can have catastrophic financial consequences for surviving depen-
dents. In the United States, there are high rates of widow poverty with one in five widows
being below the federal poverty line (FPL) and evidence of increased labor force participa-
tion by surviving dependents (Sevak, Weir and Willis, 2004; Elliott et al., 2011; Fadlon and
Nielsen, 2015). Consequences from premature death like higher poverty or increased labor
supply, precautionary savings, remarriage rates, or reliance on relatives can be mitigated
by holding life insurance. To what extent does life insurance fulfill the classic “consump-
tion smoothing” role, in turn reducing other distortions? Although several studies have
speculated that increased life insurance coverage would reduce the incidence of poverty for
surviving spouses (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1991; Bernheim et al., 2003), there has been, to
date, no direct evidence.
Our study provides such evidence on how life insurance payouts influence surviving
spouses, by using 20 years of data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). We ana-
lyze the well-being of individuals whose spouses died during or soon after his or her peak
earnings years, and examine the elderly individual’s financial status three years following
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2the spouse’s death. The HRS contains detailed financial information including payouts from
life insurance policies and accurate information on the precise date of death.
In this sample of premature deaths, the correlation between the surviving spouse’s finan-
cial well-being and life insurance holdings is positive, yet interpreting such a relationship
as causal is problematic due to omitted variables bias. In particular, households with more
competent financial planning would likely have both greater levels of life insurance coverage
and better outcomes for surviving spouses. Therefore, we adopt an instrumental variables
(IV) approach. We exploit the fact that employer-sponsored life insurance is a non-trivial
portion of total life insurance payouts, and that such payouts vary systematically by indus-
try, after controlling for other sources of heterogeneity like job quality. Additionally, these
payouts vary by age-at-death and work status (often ratcheting down dramatically at age
65, and only paying out for recent workers). Thus, the nearly as-good-as-random varia-
tion that arises from precise age at death among the sample of premature deaths provides
additional identifying variation.
With OLS, we find significant effects of lump-sum life insurance payouts on the well-
being of surviving spouses without controlling for socio-economic factors. Once we control
for such factors and instrument for life insurance payouts, there is no significant effect on
reducing poverty of surviving spouses. These IV findings are consistent with the idea that
life insurance payouts are simply a proxy for financial savviness, but do not cause higher
long-run financial well-being. One possible explanation for this result is that surviving
spouses spend the large financial windfall from life insurance very quickly, mitigating its
effect in the medium- or long-run. Our findings suggest that lump-sum life insurance payouts
may be less effective than an annuitized payout.
In addition to the policy importance, our findings contribute to a literature where com-
monly assumed causal relationships are either diminished or eliminated with the inclusion
of additional covariates, balanced samples, or IV techniques. Examples include the conse-
quences of subsidized housing (Currie and Yelowitz, 2000), military service (Angrist, 1990),
arrests (Grogger, 1995), substance use (Rees, Argys and Averett, 2001), teen pregnancy
(Hotz, McElroy and Sanders, 2005), and depression (Cseh, 2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides an overview of
life insurance markets. Section II describes the data. Section III provides the empirical
3specification. Section IV presents and discusses our results. Section V concludes.
I. Life Insurance Markets
Institutional features of the life insurance markets are important for understanding life
insurance’s influence on the well-being of surviving spouses and explaining the instrumen-
tal variables approach described hereafter. Individuals generally pay an annual premium,
and their heirs receive a payment if the insured individual dies while covered by life insur-
ance. Life insurance is separated into individual and group markets. Consumers purchase
individual market coverage directly through the insurer commonly in the form of term or
whole life coverage policies.1 In contrast, group coverage generally originates through an
employer and is known as employer-sponsored life insurance (ESLI). ESLI typically has an
automatic portion provided by the employer and an option to purchase additional cover-
age through payroll deductions. Overall, ESLI constitutes a significant portion of all life
insurance, representing 37 percent of the face value (amount payable at death) for all life
insurance holdings. The standard form of payment for group life insurance is a lump-sum
distribution (Grossman, 1992). For employed adults, 53 percent have some ESLI coverage
and 24 percent exclusively have ESLI coverage.2 Although ESLI and individual market
coverage are close substitutes, there appears to be minimal crowd-out between individual
and ESLI coverage (Harris and Yelowitz, 2015a). Consequently, increased ESLI generally
translates into increased total life insurance coverage.
Employer-sponsored life insurance (ESLI) varies systematically by industry even for work-
ers in similar occupations.3 Table 1 shows the proportion of individuals in each industry
that have life insurance coverage at all, as well as those exceeding face values of $10,000,
$20,000 and $50,000.4,5 The table shows significant variation by industry with a 37 percent-
age point difference in having any coverage between the most and least generous industries.
1Term life insurance provides coverage for a specified period of time (typically ranging from 10 to 30 years) and
pays the face value of the policy upon death of the policyholder. Whole life insurance provides coverage for life and
has an investment portion that accumulates a cash value over time.
2Percents calculated from tabulations of the 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993 panels of the Survey of Income and
Program Participation using individual weights.
3Other fringe benefits also vary systematically by industry, even for the same occupation. See Ahn and Yelowitz
(2016) for an analysis of paid sick leave.
4We use the 1990-1993 SIPP for these calculations; it contains individual level information on life insurance
coverage, large sample sizes, and industry codes. Additionally, SIPP data has been used in recent studies on life
insurance (Harris and Yelowitz, 2014, 2015b; Hedengren and Stratmann, 2016).
5We use SIPP data from 1990 to 1993 to match the industry conditions when we first observe individuals in the
HRS.
4The second panel gives an example of within-occupation variation coming from industry
classification. The table shows that secretaries—where duties/quality of the job is thought
to be fairly homogeneous—have at least $20,000 in face value coverage 30 percentage points
more often in the most generous industry relative to the least generous industry. The third
panel shows that this variation persists for low earners with relatively little education that
are the most likely to be near the poverty line.6 In short, for workers with the same skill
set, the likelihood of being offered ESLI, and the generosity of such insurance, varies with
industry draw.7
In addition to industry variation for ESLI, there is also a large discontinuity in the face
value of ESLI coverage at age 65 for several reasons. First, due to cost considerations,
firms commonly reduce the face value of automatic ESLI for employees at age 65 (Miller,
1985).8 In 1988, 56 percent of ESLI plans for full-time workers imposed benefit reductions
for older workers, most commonly occurring at age 65 (Bellet, 1989).9 These reductions
occur most frequently for firms offering coverage in larger face values relative to firms
that offer smaller face values (Hyland, 1991). If plans have multiple age based reductions,
generally these occur at age 65 and 70. For example, coverage might be reduced to 65
percent of the full benefit amount at age 65 and then further reduced to 50 percent at
age 70 (Bellet, 1989; Grossman, 1992). Second, supplemental ESLI policies are commonly
priced based on 5-year age bins with increasingly large supplemental premium hikes as
employees age. For example, at a large public university studied in Harris and Yelowitz
(2015a), premiums increase 84 percent upon turning age 65. This increased cost may deter
the purchase of supplemental coverage as employees age. Third, ESLI is employment-
contingent, meaning that if an individual dies while employed they will receive the ESLI
payout whereas individuals that die even shortly after leaving the firm will not receive a
payout.10 This mechanically decreases life insurance coverage when employees retire, which
6Appendix Table A1 shows significant industry variation using a regression framework controlling for earnings,
education and occupational codes.
7Both Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995) and Chetty et al. (2014) exploit firm-level variation in pension offerings in
examining the effects on savings behavior.
8The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prevents employer from discriminating against older workers
in benefits. However, if employers spend equal amounts to buy life insurance coverage for old and young employees,
they do not violate the ADEA even though this translates into more coverage for the young. For a review of the
ADEA see Neumark (2003).
9Given that our instrumental variables strategy uses work behavior for HRS participants when initially observed
(most often 1992), the findings on ESLI structure from this period are highly relevant.
10Some ESLI policies have a “portability” clause where individuals can continue with the same coverage after
leaving the firm. However, insurance companies generally price these policies based on the adversely selected pool of
individuals that choose to continue coverage. Therefore, the portable insurance represents a significant cost to former
5often occurs at 65.
Figure 1(a) illustrates that there was a 30.7 percent decline in employees with ESLI
coverage at age 65 relative to age 64.11 Selection bias—where only workers with jobs that
are less likely to have coverage continue to be employed after age 65—could be driving this
distinct drop. From the SIPP, employees that completed at least 12 years of education
have ESLI coverage twice as much as those that did not. Additionally, the proportion of
employees with less than 12 years of education increases with age as they have a tendency to
retire later. In Figure 1(b) we exclude employees who have less than 12 years of education
who are both more likely to continue employment after 65 and less likely to have ESLI in
an attempt to lessen the selection bias. That is, the sample of workers and jobs is likely to
be more balanced. As shown, the drop is nearly identical, with a 32.1 percent reduction at
age 65 with the restricted sample. This provides empirical support that the institutional
features described above drive the discontinuous drop in coverage at age 65, and the drop
does not appear to be coming from more negatively selected jobs, but rather institutional
design.
II. Data
We use longitudinal data from the HRS from 1992 to 2012 to analyze the effect of life
insurance on the well-being of surviving spouses. For consistency across survey years, we
use the RAND HRS data file (version O) supplemented by the original HRS data files.12
The HRS uses both exit interviews completed by surviving relatives and merged information
from the National Death Index (NDI) to ascertain accurate mortality information.
There are 37,317 unique individuals surveyed from 1992 to 2012. We restrict the sample to
individuals that reported being married during the sample years (N=26,037). In addition,
we restrict the sample to widows or widowers whose spouses died during or soon after the
peak earning years (between age 55 and 68) who we observe three years following their
spouse’s death (439 surviving spouses).13
employees that wish to continue coverage.
11These figures would suggest a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, where the running variable is age. See Imbens
and Lemieux (2008). Unfortunately, our HRS sample sizes for age at death around this discontinuity are too small
for such an approach.
12The RAND version imputes income and assets based on unfolding bracket questions that are used in this study.
For full documentation see http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/modules/meta/rand/randhrso/randhrs O.pdf.
13Given the biennial nature of the HRS, we technically look at the financial status of individuals two to three years
following their spouse’s death. For brevity, in the text we simply refer to this as three years.
6The HRS sample started in 1992 with individuals aged 51-61. At that time, average life
expectancy, conditional on living to age 51, was 77 for men and 82 for women.14 Of the
individuals who died between age 55 and 68, nearly 60 percent reported having better than
a 50 percent chance of living to 75. Therefore, our sample consists of widows and widowers
whose spouses had premature deaths, the majority of which were unexpected.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for individuals as measured three years following
their spouse’s death. The sample is predominately white and approximately three-quarters
have at least a high school education. A little over half of the sample received life insurance
payouts. However, many of these policies were relatively small and only 30 percent received
payouts greater than $20,000.15 Conditional on receiving a life insurance settlement, the
mean payout was $50,031 with a median payout of $26,348. Figure (2) shows that distri-
bution of payouts conditional on receiving one. Approximately half off all individuals that
were awarded a settlement received less than $25,000.
III. Empirical Methods
State and federal assistance programs such as Medicaid, Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are designed to help
low-income individuals, including those that are at or near poverty. To capture life in-
surance’s influence on reducing reliance on government assistance programs, we use the
threshold of 1.5x the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) as our primary measure of well-being.16
Given the somewhat arbitrary nature of this cutoff, we include alternative specifications in
the appendix, which include being below 1.0x the FPL, receiving food stamps, and being on
Medicaid. The results from these specifications are consistent with the findings presented
in the main text.
We use the following regression framework to estimate the influence of life insurance on
14Life expectancy estimates come from the Social Security Administration Period Life Table, 1994. See https:
//web.archive.org/web/19970617031009/http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6.html.
15All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2012 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
16We use the RAND measure of total household income less food stamp income for income used in the poverty
status calculations. A more accurate measure would add income from all non-core household residents to the measure
of total household income. However, for earlier years in the sample, income from non-core household residents is not
available. Consequently, we use official poverty thresholds for the relevant years from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) and assume that the household contains only the individual after the death of the spouse. In addition, the
thresholds given by the BLS have discontinuities at age 65, which could confound our analysis. We therefore use the
threshold for those under 65 regardless of age.
7the financial status of surviving spouses:
(1) Under1.5xFPLi = β0 + β1Total Payouti + β2Xi + β3Xj + β4Xh + εi
where Under1.5xFPLi equals one for surviving spouse i if income is less than 1.5x the
federal poverty line three years following the spouse’s death. Total Payouti is an indicator
for individual i receiving a payout greater than a given threshold. Xi is a vector of controls
for the spouse’s education, race/ethnicity, and employment status measured at the first
observation of the husband/wife pair (generally 1992). Xj is a vector of characteristics
for deceased spouse that includes educational level and occupation code from the current
job or if not working from a previous job. Both of these covariates attempt to control
for financial astuteness and job quality.17 Xh is a vector of controls for income and net
worth for household h measured once again at the initial interview for the couple. The key
coefficient is β1; the hypothesis is that higher life insurance payouts reduce poverty, so that
βˆ1 < 0.
The above regression imperfectly controls for financial planning. Households that are
adept at financial planning will likely have more life insurance coverage and are more likely
to have financial means during retirement.18 Consequently, our results will be biased toward
finding a larger effect (more negative) of receiving a life insurance payout on being below
the 1.5x FPL.
To address these concerns, we use an instrumental variables approach that uses payout
differences by industry, and age of death. As outlined above, there is substantial industry
variation in ESLI coverage, which constitutes a significant portion of total life insurance
coverage. Industry choice is arguably orthogonal to financial planning capabilities includ-
ing life insurance preferences after controlling for occupation and socio-economic variables.
Additionally, if the spouse died prior to retirement, then the individual would receive an
ESLI payout whereas if the spouse died following retirement a ESLI payout would not likely
17Our approach of controlling for job quality with occupation, and relying on the across-industry variation in ESLI
generosity for identification, is similar in spirit to other work. Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010) note that in the
company they examine, “employees doing the same job in the same location may face different prices for their health
insurance benefits due to their business unit affiliations.”
18Gandolfi and Miners (1996) find that education increases life insurance holdings and Browne and Kim (1993)
postulate that a higher education level raises life insurance holdings through increased risk aversion and awareness of
the necessity of insurance.
8be received. However, actual retirement age is correlated with financial planning and health
and therefore endogenous as well.
Given the institutional features of decreased coverage at age 65 in addition to age 65 being
a focal point for retirement, we construct our instrument, Zi, to be zero if the deceased
spouse dies after age 65 and assign the industry average based on their earliest observation
(when the worker was typically 51-61) if they die prior to age 65.19 For example, from the
first panel of Table 1, the instrument for receiving any life insurance (Payout > $0) for
someone who died at age 63, who was employed in the public administration industry in
the initial survey, would be 0.89. However, if the individual died at age 66, the instrument
would be coded zero. Similarly, when we instrument for receiving a payout greater than
$50,000, we use the proportion of employees in a given industry who have life insurance
coverage greater than $50,000. For example, from the last column and first panel of Table
1, individuals who initially reported working in retail who died at age 58 would be coded as
0.33 for the instrument of receiving a payout greater than $50,000. In addition, we code Zi
to be zero if the deceased spouse was unemployed or self-employed in the initial survey. After
controlling for other covariates—like occupation—the interaction of the deceased spouse’s
age-at-death (conditional on early death), initial employment status, and initial industry
strongly predict ESLI holdings and is highly correlated with total holdings, yet is likely
uncorrelated with the subsequent well-being of the surviving spouse, except insofar as it
predicts life insurance holdings. Therefore, Zi should be correlated with the endogenous
regressor, Total Payouti, and uncorrelated with εi.
The first-stage IV estimation equation directly tests our assumption that our instrument
is significantly correlated with life insurance payouts.
(2) Total Payouti = γ0 + γ1Zi + γ2Xi + γ3Xj + γ4Xh + ui
where ui is the error term and all other variables are defined the same way as in equation
(1). The second stage is the same as the regression presented in equation (1) except we
use the estimated Total Payouti from the first stage. The second stage estimation will
recover the local average treatment effect (LATE) for receiving a life insurance payout. The
19As shown in Appendix Table A3, the only major difference between individuals that die just prior to age 65
relative to those that die shortly thereafter is employment status and spouses age (mechanical).
92SLS estimator will explain the influence of the life insurance payout on the well-being of
the surviving spouse for those who have or do not have life insurance coverage based on
industry assignment and as-good-as-random time of death. The estimate will not capture
the effect on those that would have had life insurance coverage regardless of ESLI (Imbens
and Angrist, 1994).
IV. Results
To give a baseline comparison, we first regress having income below 1.5x FLP on payouts
without controls. For ease of interpretation, all results use linear models, even though the
outcome is binary.20 The first columns of Table 3 show a significant correlation between
receiving a payout (at various thresholds) and being above the 1.5x FPL. The latter columns
of Table 3 show that after the inclusion of controls, the effect is drastically reduced or
disappears altogether. For example, the coefficient on receiving a payout greater than
$20,000, the point estimate changed from a 15.4 percentage point decrease in the probability
of being under 1.5x FPL without controls to essentially zero with controls from a base
of 27.3 percent. The only coefficient that remains statistically significant after controls
is for receiving any life insurance payout, although the magnitude has been significantly
reduced. A priori, one might expect small payouts to not significantly influence well-being
and larger payouts, such as $50,000, to have a significant influence. This finding highlights
that receiving any payout might be indicative of financial planning—which is imperfectly
controlled for in the specification—rather than a consumption smoothing influence of a
significant payout. An alternative explanation could be that small payouts are significant
enough to help those on the margin avoid high interest debt that reduces long-run well-
being, but that there are rapidly diminishing returns to large payouts. As expected, for the
surviving spouse, more education and being employed during the initial survey significantly
decreases the likelihood of being under the near poverty line. In addition, surviving spouses
of households with higher net worth in the initial interview are less likely to be in poverty
three years following their spouse’s death.
To understand which covariates cause the change in magnitude from the regression with-
out controls to the full specification with controls we use a decomposition method described
20Results from a probit model are similar. For a discussion of the use of linear probability models in two state least
squares estimation see Angrist and Krueger (2001) and Kelejian (1971).
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in Gelbach (2016). Essentially, the traditional method of sequentially adding covariates to
see changes in the coefficient of interest produces ambiguous results based on the order in
which covariates are added. Gelbach (2016) proposes calculating the omitted variable bias
of excluding each covariate separately from the full model to ascertain the contribution of
each covariate to the total change. Table 4 illustrates the influence of different groups of
controls in explaining the percentage point change in the coefficient for Total Payouti. For
example, isolating the regressions that use receiving any payout as the independent variable
of interest (columns 1 and 5 of Table 3) we see that the total change in the coefficient from
adding controls was 0.089. From Table 4 we can see that 38.9 percent of the change in the
coefficient on receiving a payout comes from controlling for household net worth. As well,
the addition of household income accounts for 19.1 percent of the overall coefficient change
from adding covariates. From this table we can also see that deceased spouse’s education
becomes increasingly important as the payout threshold increases in explaining the decrease
in influence of life insurance payouts. This reflects not only the correlation of net worth, in-
come and deceased spouse’s education with the well-being of the surviving spouse, but also
the correlation between these factors and receiving a payout. These findings illustrate that
a majority of the effect of life insurance may be due to financial sophistication as captured
by net worth, income and the deceased spouse’s education.
We next instrument for life insurance payouts using industry averages from the SIPP
interacted with spouse’s age of death. Each threshold is instrumented for by using the
corresponding proportion of individuals in a given industry that have face value coverage
greater than the given threshold. For example, the instrument for receiving a payout greater
than $20,000 is the proportion of individuals with life insurance coverage greater than
$20,000 in the same industry as the observation, conditional on being employed and dying
before age 65.
The first stage is reported in Table 5 and indicates statistically significant correlation
between life insurance payouts and industry averages for face values greater than $10,000,
$20,000 or $50,000. The F-statistics for the excluded instruments in the final three columns
vary between 9.3 and 18.2 all above the 15 percent maximal bias threshold (8.96) in Stock
and Yogo (2005). This indicates strong instruments for payouts greater than $10,000,
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$20,000 or $50,000.21 We present the second stage regression results in Table 6. After
taking into account the endogenous nature of life insurance payouts, we do not find an
effect of life insurance in reducing the propensity to be below 1.5x FPL three years after
death. Given that we do not find an effect three years following the spouse’s death, it is
very unlikely that we would find a significant effect looking at a longer time horizon.22
Life insurance payouts have the potential to decrease other, arguably less-efficient, ways of
smoothing consumption such as increased labor force participation and re-marriage. Table
7 shows that receiving a life insurance payout greater than $50,000 does not reduce labor
supply or remarriage and does not increase annuitization. Additionally, in Table 8 we show
that the effect of life insurance payouts is the same for widows and widowers.
Lusardi, Michaud and Mitchell (2016) show that 30-40 percent of retirement wealth in-
equality comes from differences in financial knowledge. As is shown from the significant
reduction in the influence of life insurance by adding basic socioeconomic variables, life
insurance appears to be more of a marker for financial knowledge rather than a factor in
improving the well-being of surviving spouses. Nonetheless, one would expect that receiving
$50,000 could have a measurable influence on financial well-being. One possible explanation
for the lack of a significant effect of life insurance on the well-being of surviving spouses
is that individuals spend the money soon after receipt rather than using it to replace lost
future income.
There is ample evidence supporting this argument. A similar type of lump sum distri-
bution occurs when individuals with defined contribution (DC) plans change employment.
When employees switch jobs, they generally have the option to leave their DC pension
plans with their former employer, rollover the amount into their new employers’ DC plan,
or receive a preretirement lump sum distribution. Poterba and Venti (1998) find that lump
sum distributions are common and most distributions are not rolled over into qualified
retirement saving accounts. In order to encourage rollover of lump sum distributions into
qualified savings accounts—rather than increase spending from the distribution—the federal
government implemented excise taxes and withholding taxes to discourage such behavior.
Chang (1996) finds that such tax penalties in general encourage rollover into qualified sav-
21In a similar fashion, Saiz (2010) cites evidence of a strong instrument given an F-statistic above the 20 percent
maximal bias threshold.
22Due to sample limitations, we do not look at longer time horizons than three years.
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ings accounts but are insignificant at deterring the use of funds for current consumption
by lower-income recipients. In addition, Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2006) in a study
on tax rebate spending find that individuals with the lowest income and the least liquid
assets—those that are most likely to be near the poverty line—spent significantly more of
the rebate relative to higher income individuals. This persistent tendency to quickly spend
lump sum transfers, especially for those that are close to the poverty line, certainly could
be the reason that medium- or long-run outcomes are unaffected.
One possible alternative to lump sum distributions of life insurance payouts is annuitiza-
tion. As shown in the last section of Table 7, there is no evidence that surviving spouses—on
their own accord—increase use of annuities upon receiving life insurance payouts. It is likely
that sophisticated financial planning, like annuitization, is a low priority given the circum-
stances surrounding a premature or unexpected death. In the context of lump sum payments
from DC plans, Brown (2009) argues for automatic annuitization to provide a guaranteed
income stream for life to hedge against the risk of outliving one’s income. Furthermore,
Bu¨tler and Teppa (2007) show using Swiss data that an initial default of annuitization is
effective at increasing overall annuitization.
The literature on behavioral economics potentially sheds light on policy options to make
lump sum payments from life insurance more effective. Individuals tend to display time
inconsistent preferences thus necessitating the need for commitment mechanisms (Laibson,
1997). Research has shown that individuals display relatively high discount rates in the short
run, but lower discount rates in the long run known as hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie, 1992).
Therefore, individuals would be more likely to sign on to annuitization of life insurance
payouts at the time they purchase life insurance coverage. An initial default from ESLI of
annuitization (with the possibility of opting into a lump sum payment) might circumvent
the issue of increased consumption following a payout.
However, there is one possible concern with automatic annuitization of life insurance
payouts. Due to correlated socioeconomic status and bereavement effects, life expectancy
between a husband and wife is highly correlated (Espinosa and Evans, 2008). The value of
a life annuity is directly related to the owner’s longevity and longer-lived individuals have
more to gain from an annuity relative to shorter-lived individuals. Consequently, annuities
would be a relatively worse deal for surviving spouses who have a higher mortality rate
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than the typical annuitant. Nonetheless, if insurance companies used pooled life insurance
payout recipients in the determination of annuity payments then bundling the two products
could be advantageous.
V. Conclusion
Premature death of a breadwinner can have devastating financial consequences on the sur-
viving spouse. Increased longevity and years spent in retirement for the surviving spouse
only exacerbates these negative consequences. Additionally, the aging population in the
United States is straining the Social Security System including Survivor’s Benefits, which
provided an average monthly benefit of $1,309 to 3.8 million widows and widowers in 2010
(Shelton and Nuschler, 2012). These features highlight the importance of private life insur-
ance in mitigating the negative financial consequences of premature death on elderly surviv-
ing spouses. Not only could life insurance reduce these negative financial consequences, but
it also has the potential of reducing dependence on other government assistance programs
such as SNAP, Medicaid, and SSI for elderly surviving spouses.
Using the HRS, we analyzed the effect of life insurance coverage and subsequent payouts
on the well-being of surviving spouses. We find that after controlling for financial and ed-
ucational factors and using instrumental variables to address endogeneity, the influence of
life insurance disappears. These findings indicate that life insurance is more of a marker
for financial planning rather than a driver at improving the well-being of surviving spouses
and decreasing the incidence of government assistance. The HRS is the only panel dataset
of which we are aware that allows us to follow a reasonably sized sample of widows and
widowers before and after the death of their spouse and also observe life insurance payouts.
Nevertheless, our sample sizes are fairly small and we are unable to fully exploit the regres-
sion discontinuity that arises from the institutional design of ESLI, which typically ratchets
down payout at 65.
A natural question that remains, given that well-being is unaffected, is how are large
lump-sum life insurance payouts actually utilized? Evidence from other studies suggests
different lump sum payments translate into immediate, increased consumption but no par-
allel evidence exists for life insurance payouts. Assuming that behavior from life insurance
payouts is in fact similar, a potential way to increase the effectiveness of life insurance is
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through a restructuring of policies for ESLI. Employers in conjunction with insurance com-
panies could structure policies such that annuitization was the default method of receiving
payout rather than a lump sum transfer. Given the extensive literature on inertia in the
workplace, it is likely that relatively few employees would opt out of default annuitizaiton
of life insurance payouts for their dependents, thereby potentially increasing well-being of
surviving spouses (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Chetty et al., 2014; Harris and Yelowitz, 2015a).
Another question that arises from these findings is how large would life insurance payouts
need to be to significantly influence well-being of surviving spouses. From our analysis,
we know that even $50,000 dollars in payouts does not significantly change the well-being
of surviving spouses. This implies that payouts would need to be larger, but how large
it would need to be is uncertain, and without annuitization, it is unclear whether larger
payouts would significantly influence well-being.
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Figure 1. Proportion with ESLI Coverage by Age
Note: The sample comes from the 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993 panels of the SIPP and includes employed individuals
and employees with at least 12 years of education. Person level weights were applied.
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Figure 2. CDF: Life Insurance Payouts
Note: The CDF of payouts is conditional on receiving a payout. The sample consists of
individuals whose spouses died between the ages of 55 and 68 from the HRS.
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Table 1—Life Insurance Proportions by Industry- SIPP
Face Value: >$0k >$10k >$20k >$50k
Personal Services 0.52 0.42 0.33 0.23
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing 0.53 0.47 0.40 0.29
Entertainment/Recreation 0.60 0.53 0.41 0.34
Retail 0.62 0.54 0.44 0.33
Business/Repair Services 0.65 0.59 0.51 0.41
Mining and Construction 0.68 0.63 0.54 0.43
Professional/Related Services 0.77 0.70 0.59 0.45
Wholesale 0.78 0.74 0.65 0.52
Manufacturing Non-durable 0.79 0.72 0.61 0.48
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 0.82 0.75 0.67 0.55
Manufacturing Durable 0.82 0.76 0.66 0.53
Transportation 0.83 0.78 0.69 0.57
Public Administration 0.89 0.83 0.75 0.62
Secretaries
Entertainment/Recreation 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.40
Personal Services 0.63 0.50 0.50 0.33
Business/Repair Services 0.65 0.56 0.46 0.34
Retail 0.69 0.63 0.51 0.37
Mining and Construction 0.75 0.67 0.49 0.31
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing 0.75 0.67 0.42 0.25
Manufacturing Non-durable 0.78 0.72 0.60 0.47
Professional/Related Services 0.80 0.68 0.54 0.36
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 0.81 0.71 0.65 0.45
Wholesale 0.81 0.74 0.64 0.43
Manufacturing Durable 0.83 0.73 0.58 0.43
Transportation 0.86 0.77 0.72 0.58
Public Administration 0.87 0.80 0.67 0.47
No High School Diploma & Earnings <$20,000
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing 0.26 0.16 0.12 0.05
Wholesale 0.35 0.29 0.18 0.09
Personal Services 0.36 0.24 0.13 0.07
Entertainment/Recreation 0.36 0.21 0.07 0.07
Business/Repair Services 0.36 0.28 0.23 0.16
Retail 0.37 0.27 0.18 0.12
Mining and Construction 0.38 0.31 0.22 0.10
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 0.45 0.40 0.31 0.15
Manufacturing Durable 0.48 0.35 0.20 0.12
Transportation 0.49 0.44 0.27 0.16
Manufacturing Non-durable 0.49 0.35 0.22 0.10
Public Administration 0.51 0.34 0.26 0.14
Professional/Related Services 0.54 0.35 0.21 0.11
Note: Means are derived from the 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993 SIPP panels consisting of 62,137 full
and part time workers from ages 24 to 64. In the second and third panels, means were derived from
2,251 and 2,563 individuals respectively. Earnings used in the third panel are measured in 2012
dollars and roughly capture the lowest earnings quartile.
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Table 2—Summary Statistics for Surviving Spouse
(1)
Demographics (3 years after spouse’s death)
Age (Years) 65.29
White 0.83
Black 0.09
Hispanic 0.07
Other race/ethnicity 0.01
Education (3 years after spouse’s death)
Less than High School 0.25
High School Grad. 0.65
College Grad. 0.11
Poverty (3 years after spouse’s death)
Poverty Ratio 3.62
Under Poverty Line 0.11
Under 1.5x Poverty Line (Near Poverty) 0.26
Finances (at Initial Survey)
Household Income ($1k) 42.29
Household Net Worth ($100k) 3.84
Life Insurance (at spouse’s death)
Received Payout 0.55
Received Payout > $5k 0.49
Received Payout > $10k 0.41
Received Payout > $20k 0.30
Received Payout > $50k 0.19
Received Payout > $100k 0.07
Payout ($1k) 27.46
Payout if >0 ($1k) 50.03
Observations 439
Note: The sample consists of surviving spouses from the HRS whose spouses died be-
tween the ages of 55 and 68. Respondent level weights were used to calculate means.
Payouts, income, and net worth are reported in 2012 dollars.
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Table 3—OLS, Dependent Variable: Below 1.5x poverty line (Near Poverty) 3 Years After Spouse’s
Death
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Surviving Spouse (at spouse’s death)
Life Ins. Payout > $0 −0.170∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗
(0.039) (0.037)
Life Ins. Payout > $10k −0.141∗∗ −0.015
(0.050) (0.045)
Life Ins. Payout > $20k −0.154∗∗ −0.011
(0.065) (0.049)
Life Ins. Payout > $50k −0.161∗∗ −0.045
(0.064) (0.048)
Surviving Spouse (at initial survey)
High School Grad. −0.111∗ −0.115∗∗−0.115∗∗−0.115∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051)
College Grad. −0.049 −0.055 −0.055 −0.051
(0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060)
Black −0.037 −0.038 −0.038 −0.041
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Hispanic 0.194∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.206∗∗
(0.091) (0.092) (0.093) (0.095)
Other race/ethnicity −0.014 −0.002 −0.002 −0.012
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098)
Employed Full-time −0.096∗∗∗−0.092∗∗∗−0.092∗∗∗−0.095∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Deceased Spouse (at initial survey)
High School Grad. −0.102∗∗∗−0.103∗∗∗−0.102∗∗∗−0.103∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
College Grad. −0.131∗∗−0.127∗∗−0.127∗∗−0.123∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Household (at initial survey)
Net Worth 2nd Quartile −0.156∗∗−0.164∗∗−0.166∗∗−0.165∗∗
(0.058) (0.060) (0.059) (0.058)
Net Worth 3rd Quartile −0.223∗∗∗−0.239∗∗∗−0.241∗∗∗−0.241∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.070) (0.068) (0.067)
Net Worth 4th Quartile −0.227∗∗∗−0.233∗∗∗−0.234∗∗∗−0.234∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Income $25k-50k −0.032 −0.035 −0.035 −0.034
(0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
Income $50k-100k −0.142∗∗∗−0.152∗∗∗−0.153∗∗∗−0.150∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037)
Income >$100k −0.123∗∗−0.126∗∗−0.126∗ −0.122∗
(0.053) (0.058) (0.060) (0.059)
Note: The sample consists of 439 surviving spouses from the HRS whose spouses died between the ages of 55 and 68.
Initial occupation code of the deceased spouse is included but not reported. Of the sample, 27.3 percent are under
the near poverty line. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 4—Gelbach Decomposition: Explaining the Coefficient Change on Payout Due to Adding Controls
Payout>$0 Payout>$10k Payout>$20k Payout>$50k
contribution % of gap contribution % of gap contribution % of gap contribution % of gap
Household Net Worth 0.035∗∗ 38.9% 0.043∗∗∗ 34.3% 0.042∗∗ 28.6% 0.044∗∗ 38.0%
(0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018)
Household Income 0.017∗∗∗ 19.1% 0.026∗∗∗ 20.6% 0.032∗∗∗ 21.6% 0.028∗∗∗ 24.0%
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Deceased Spouse’s Education 0.009∗ 10.5% 0.016∗∗ 12.4% 0.023∗∗∗ 15.6% 0.023∗∗∗ 19.9%
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Surviving Spouse’s Education 0.012 13.0% 0.013 10.6% 0.015 10.6% 0.010 8.7%
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Surviving Spouse’s Race/ethnicity 0.015 17.4% 0.019∗ 14.9% 0.018 12.0% 0.010 8.5%
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Surviving Spouse’s Employment 0.002 2.8% 0.006 4.6% 0.008 5.3% 0.005 4.5%
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Deceased Spouse’s Occupation 0.001 1.7% 0.003 2.5% 0.009 6.3% 0.006 5.3%
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.021)
Total Change 0.089∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.019) (0.032) (0.037)
Note: Numbers reported reflect the influence of each covariate in the change of the Payout coefficient from the bivariate to the full controls specification. The sum of
an individual column will fully describe the Payout coefficient change from the bivariate case (first columns of Table 3) to the specification with full controls (latter
columns of Table 3). Standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 5—First Stage: HRS
Dependent Variable: payout >$0 >$10k >$20k >$50k
Deceased Spouse (at initial survey)
Industry proportion with life insurance face value >$0 0.078
(0.059)
Industry proportion with life insurance face value >$10k 0.263∗∗∗
(0.071)
Industry proportion with life insurance face value >$20k 0.283∗∗∗
(0.066)
Industry proportion with life insurance face value >$50k 0.305∗∗∗
(0.100)
Surviving Spouse (at initial survey)
High School Grad. 0.059 0.054 0.065 0.020
(0.037) (0.057) (0.053) (0.040)
College Grad. 0.088 0.041 0.106 0.106
(0.105) (0.089) (0.070) (0.076)
Black 0.011 −0.021 −0.026 −0.074∗
(0.050) (0.053) (0.048) (0.035)
Hispanic −0.175∗∗ −0.187∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.061
(0.059) (0.070) (0.040) (0.049)
Other race/ethnicity −0.177 −0.173 −0.227 −0.282∗∗
(0.181) (0.293) (0.199) (0.116)
Employed Full-time −0.062 −0.042 −0.055 −0.065∗
(0.043) (0.049) (0.044) (0.034)
Deceased Spouse (at initial survey)
High School Grad. 0.008 0.010 0.058 −0.009
(0.088) (0.063) (0.047) (0.031)
College Grad. −0.028 0.091 0.108 0.112
(0.158) (0.097) (0.082) (0.072)
Household (at initial survey)
Net Worth 2nd Quartile 0.141∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.109∗ 0.044
(0.049) (0.046) (0.058) (0.037)
Net Worth 3rd Quartile 0.230∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.081 0.021
(0.070) (0.050) (0.049) (0.045)
Net Worth 4th Quartile 0.111∗ 0.157∗ 0.115 0.035
(0.062) (0.077) (0.072) (0.069)
Income $25k-50k 0.049 0.049 0.061 0.022
(0.083) (0.068) (0.043) (0.034)
Income $50k-100k 0.149 0.157∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.081
(0.092) (0.068) (0.054) (0.049)
Income >$100k 0.064 0.128 0.162∗ 0.117
(0.104) (0.104) (0.084) (0.068)
Partial R2 (excluded instrument) 0.002 0.024 0.025 0.026
F-stat (excluded instrument) 1.735 13.894 18.196 9.285
Note: The sample consists of 439 surviving spouses from the HRS whose spouses died between the ages of 55 and
68. Initial occupation code of the deceased spouse is included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the
industry level and shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. The F-statistic is calculated using standard
errors clustered at the industry level.
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Table 6—Instrumental Variables Regression, Dependent Variable: Below 1.5x poverty line (Near
Poverty) 3 Years After Spouse’s Death
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Surviving Spouse (at spouse’s death)
Received Life Ins. Payout 0.894
(1.081)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $10k 0.289
(0.300)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $20k 0.303
(0.316)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $50k 0.355
(0.367)
Surviving Spouse (at initial survey)
High School Grad. −0.163∗∗ −0.126∗∗ −0.130∗∗ −0.118∗∗
(0.067) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055)
College Grad. −0.131 −0.064 −0.085 −0.090
(0.152) (0.075) (0.082) (0.090)
Black −0.047 −0.031 −0.029 −0.011
(0.056) (0.042) (0.041) (0.049)
Hispanic 0.364 0.262∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.086) (0.080) (0.082)
Other race/ethnicity 0.158 0.049 0.068 0.099
(0.318) (0.148) (0.157) (0.179)
Employed Full-time −0.034 −0.076∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗
(0.067) (0.020) (0.025) (0.032)
Deceased Spouse (at initial survey)
High School Grad. −0.119∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.040) (0.049) (0.032)
College Grad. −0.105 −0.156∗∗ −0.162∗∗ −0.169∗∗
(0.144) (0.065) (0.074) (0.076)
Household (at initial survey)
Net Worth 2nd Quartile −0.287∗ −0.218∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.082) (0.072) (0.058)
Net Worth 3rd Quartile −0.446∗ −0.294∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.079) (0.065) (0.061)
Net Worth 4th Quartile −0.324∗∗ −0.270∗∗∗ −0.260∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.075) (0.070) (0.075)
Income $25k-50k −0.083 −0.053 −0.057 −0.046
(0.121) (0.047) (0.046) (0.037)
Income $50k-100k −0.298 −0.210∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.082) (0.081) (0.061)
Income >$100k −0.195 −0.175∗ −0.186∗ −0.179∗
(0.170) (0.094) (0.102) (0.096)
Note: The sample consists of 439 surviving spouses from the HRS whose spouses died between the
ages of 55 and 68. Initial occupation code of the deceased spouse is included but not reported.
Of the sample, 27.3 percent are under the near poverty line. Standard errors are clustered at the
industry level and shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 7—Alternative Metrics for Well-Being of Surviving Spouse 3 Years After Spouse’s Death
Dependent Variable: Work 3 Years After Death Married 3 Years After Death Annuity 3 Years After Death
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $50k 0.016 0.073 0.280 −0.044∗ −0.040 0.334 0.018 −0.011 −0.133∗∗
(0.049) (0.044) (0.419) (0.024) (0.025) (0.274) (0.027) (0.037) (0.060)
Controls: No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
IV: No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Note: The sample consists of 439 surviving spouses from the HRS whose spouses died between the ages of 55 and 68. Controls include education, race/ethnicity
and education of the surviving spouse, education and initial occupation code of the deceased spouse, and initial net worth and income of the household. Standard
errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 8—Does Gender Matter? OLS, Dependent Variable: Below 1.5x poverty line (Near Poverty) 3
Years After Spouse’s Death
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Surviving Spouse (at spouse’s death)
Received Life Ins. Payout −0.156∗∗−0.044
(0.064) (0.054)
Received Life Ins. Payout * Male −0.039 −0.097
(0.095) (0.092)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $10k −0.178∗ −0.039
(0.088) (0.077)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $10k * Male 0.087 0.059
(0.114) (0.105)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $20k −0.195∗∗−0.039
(0.079) (0.068)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $20k * Male 0.084 0.072
(0.084) (0.077)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $50k −0.204∗∗−0.076
(0.068) (0.055)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $50k * Male 0.117 0.104
(0.106) (0.079)
Male −0.042 0.006 −0.109∗ −0.073 −0.111∗∗−0.068∗ −0.101∗∗−0.069∗∗
(0.071) (0.062) (0.058) (0.047) (0.043) (0.032) (0.037) (0.024)
Additional Controls: No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: The sample consists of 439 surviving spouses from the HRS whose spouses died between the ages of 55 and
68. Additional controls include education, race/ethnicity and education of the surviving spouse, education and initial
occupation code of the deceased spouse, and initial net worth and income of the household. Of the sample, 27.3
percent are under the near poverty line. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Appendix
Table A1—Industry Variation with Occupational and Educational Controls: SIPP
Dependent Variable: Total Coverage >$0 >$10k >$20k >$50k
Industry
Mining and Construction 0.035 0.013 −0.002 0.017
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
Manufacturing Non-durable 0.107∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.039 0.054∗∗
(0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Manufacturing Durable 0.123∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025)
Transportation 0.116∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
Wholesale 0.078∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.049∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
Retail −0.021 −0.058∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 0.088∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.039 0.052∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
Business/Repair Services −0.040∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗
(0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Personal Services −0.067∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027)
Entertainment/Recreation −0.071∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Professional/Related Services 0.074∗∗∗ 0.021 −0.027 −0.047∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Public Administration 0.146∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Income and Education
Log Earned Income 0.054∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
High School Grad 0.114∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
College Grad 0.123∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Note: The sample consists of 61,716 workers from the SIPP from panels 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 between
the ages of 24 and 64. Occupation code is included but not reported. The ommitted industry code is for
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing. Standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A2—Alternative Metrics for Well-Being of Surviving Spouse 3 Years After Spouse’s Death
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent: Under 1x FPL
Surviving Spouse (at spouse’s death)
Received Life Ins. Payout −0.111∗∗ −0.047∗ 0.978
(0.037) (0.026) (0.813)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $10k −0.089∗∗ 0.003 0.316∗
(0.040) (0.027) (0.189)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $20k −0.092∗ 0.011 0.334∗
(0.045) (0.026) (0.185)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $50k −0.077 −0.008 0.398∗
(0.053) (0.041) (0.241)
Dependent: Received Food Stamps
Surviving Spouse (at spouse’s death)
Received Life Ins. Payout −0.048∗∗ −0.009 −0.008
(0.020) (0.013) (0.407)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $10k −0.042∗ 0.003 −0.000
(0.023) (0.010) (0.131)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $20k −0.045∗ 0.001 0.003
(0.025) (0.012) (0.141)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $50k −0.043∗ −0.011 0.007
(0.023) (0.017) (0.164)
Dependent: On Medicaid
Surviving Spouse (at spouse’s death)
Received Life Ins. Payout −0.069∗∗∗ −0.029∗ 0.383
(0.019) (0.014) (0.537)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $10k −0.055∗∗ −0.007 0.114
(0.020) (0.014) (0.143)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $20k −0.054∗∗ 0.009 0.117
(0.021) (0.019) (0.151)
Received Life Ins. Payout > $50k −0.059∗∗ −0.002 0.115
(0.021) (0.016) (0.166)
Controls: No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV: No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The sample consists of 439 surviving spouses from the HRS whose spouses died between the ages of 55 and 68. Controls include education, race/ethnicity and
education of the surviving spouse, education and initial occupation code of the deceased spouse, and initial net worth and income of the household. Of the sample,
12.8 percent are under the poverty line, 4.8 percent received Food Stamps, and 6.2 percent were on Medicaid. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level
and shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A3—Deceased Spouse Mean Comparison at Last Interview
Death Age: 62-64 65-68
Work Full-time 0.26 0.15∗
Spouse’s Age 59.19 63.07∗∗∗
Self-reported Probability of Living to 75 0.56 0.58
White 0.82 0.73
Black 0.11 0.18
Hispanic 0.07 0.09
Other race/ethnicity 0.00 0.00
Has a Child 0.96 0.98
Less than High School 0.20 0.23
High School Grad. 0.72 0.63
College Grad. 0.08 0.15
Earned Income ($1k) 14.72 19.52
Household Net Worth ($100k) 2.74 3.83
Observations 100 200
Note: Sample consists of individuals who died between the age 62 and 68
measured in the last interview prior to death from the HRS. Income and
net worth are reported in 2012 dollars. Indicators for statistical difference
between means are given by ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
